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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor acquired a promissory note. The
debtor also owed money to the debtor's parents and assigned
the note to the parents. Despite the assignment, the debtor
pursued collection of the note and eventually obtained a
settlement in excess of the amount owed to the debtor's
parents. The debtor paid a portion of the settlement to the
parents within one year of filing for bankruptcy and the
trustee sought recovery of the payment as a preferential
transfer. The debtor argued that the payment was merely
completion of the assignment. The court held that the
assignment created only an unperfected security interest
since the parents did not receive the entire settlement of the
note and were entitled only to the amount of the note up to
the amount owed to them by the debtor. Because the parents
received more than they would as unsecured creditors in a
Chapter 7 case, the payment of the note proceeds was an
avoidable preferential transfer.  In re Reeves, 65 F.3d 670
(8th Cir. 1995).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor was a shareholder
of an agricultural corporation and owned other agriculture-
related businesses. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor's wife formed a new corporation which issued all of
its stock to the wife. The debtor transferred all business
assets to the corporation but did not receive any interest in
the new corporation, although the debtor continued to
operate the businesses transferred to the corporation. The
court held that the transfers were fraudulent and imposed a
constructive trust on the corporation's assets. The issue in
this case was what post-petition assets were included in the
bankruptcy estate. The court held that the constructive trust
resulted in the stock of the new corporation being included
in the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the bankruptcy estate
did not include post-petition assets acquired through post-
petition transfers to the corporation or assets acquired
through the uncompensated services of the debtor for the
corporation.  In re Reeves, 65 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed a residence as an
exempt homestead; however, at the time of the petition, the
debtor was not living at the residence because of a fire
which occurred more than six months before the petition
date. Under Minn. Stat. § 510.07, if a home owner does not
reside at a residence for over six months, a new declaration
of homestead must be filed in order for the owner to claim a
homestead exemption for the property. The debtor failed to
file this notice and a creditor objected to the exemption
based on the debtor's failure to file this notice. The
Bankruptcy Court had cited a Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision which held that the filing requirement did not have
a casualty exception; however, the Bankruptcy Court
rejected that decision and held that a casualty exception did
exist and allowed the exemption. The District Court
reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals' decision was
applicable and denied the homestead exemption. The court
noted that the fire did not prevent the debtor from meeting
the filing requirements. In re Kasden, 186 B.R. 667 (D.
Minn. 1995), rev'g, 181 B.R. 390 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
SALE OF COLLATERAL. The debtor, a tomato
farmer, filed for Chapter 11 but submitted a liquidating plan
which was confirmed. The plan provided for abandonment
of some property and a lifting of the automatic stay against
other property to allow the secured creditor to foreclose
against the debtor's land. The plan provided for the sale of
the farm equipment and provided that the debtor would
repair and maintain the equipment so as to realize the
maximum selling price. The debtor was to be allowed the
costs of maintenance and sale of the property from the
proceeds as an administrative expense. The proceeds of the
sale of all property exceeded the claim of the creditor. The
Bankruptcy Court determined the amount of costs allowed
to the debtor and assessed that amount against the secured
claim of the creditor. The creditor argued that under the
plan, the costs were assessable against the proceeds and did
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not reduce the secured claim. The appellate court agreed.
The Bankruptcy Court also allowed the creditor interest on
its claim as determined by the foreclosure judgment which
included interest charged from the date of the bankruptcy
petition. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
amount of the creditor's claim was determined as of the
petition date and that interest would be allowed on that
amount and could not be charged on interest accruing after
that date. In re Torcise, 187 B.R. 18 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtor had obtained a loan from the
FmHA on which the debtor had defaulted pre-petition. The
debtor had also enrolled farm land in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). The FmHA notified the debtor of
its application to the ASCS to offset the debtor’s CRP
payments against the default on the debtor’s FmHA loan.
The offset was allowed and the debtor filed for Chapter 13.
The debtor assumed the CRP contract. The debtor argued
that the FmHA was not entitled to offset the CRP payments
in the bankruptcy case because the CRP contract was
executory and contingent upon the debtor’s performance. In
addition, the assumption of the contract post-petition
destroyed the mutuality between the pre- and post-petition
CRP contracts. The court held that the filing of the
bankruptcy case and assumption of the CRP contract did not
change the basic rights and obligations of the parties and
that the CRP payments could be offset against the debtor’s
debt to the FmHA. In re Buckner, 165 B.R. 942 (D.Kan.
1994), app. dismissed, 66 F.3d 263 (10th Cir. 1995).
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES. The debtor
originally filed a joint bankruptcy case in which the IRS
filed a claim for the 100 percent penalty of I.R.C. § 6672 for
failure to withhold employment taxes. The debtors owned
residential property as tenants by the entireties and, after the
property was sold under order of the Bankruptcy Court, the
debtors retained ownership of the proceeds as tenants by the
entireties. The wife died and the issue arose as to whether
the decedent's share of the proceeds remained subject only
to her separate debts or whether the proceeds all became
part of the husband's bankruptcy estate. The court ruled that,
upon the death of the wife, the entireties property passed by
operation of state law to the husband and was included in
the husband's bankruptcy estate. In re Ballard, 65 F.3d 367
(4th Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
JURISDICTION. The debtors had originally filed for
Chapter 12, and during the case the trustee filed a complaint
against two creditors for recovery of alleged preferential
transfers. A default judgment was obtained against one
creditor but the other case was in discovery when the
Chapter 12 case was dismissed by motion of the trustee. The
trustee did not seek retention of jurisdiction over the
unresolved preferential transfer case. The trustee later
petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to retain jurisdiction over
the unresolved litigation.  The court held that because a
preferential transfer action occurs only within the context of
a bankruptcy case, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case
dissolves the preferential transfer action and jurisdiction
over the preferential transfer action cannot be retained. In re
Davison, 186 B.R. 741 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995).
TRUSTEE FEES. Prior to the bankruptcy filing, a
creditor had obtained a state court judgment of foreclosure
against the Chapter 12 debtors. The state court judgment
required the debtors to deposit with the court the proceeds
of the sale of collateral securing the creditor's loans to the
debtors which were the subject of the foreclosure judgment.
The debtors' plan provided for turnover of these funds to the
creditor, without payment of the trustee's fees. The trustee
objected, arguing that the turnover was a payment to a
creditor with an impaired claim and, under In re Fulkrod,
973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1992), the trustee's fees were to be
paid on all payments on impaired claims. The court held that
the turnover was not a payment on a claim but more like a
turnover of collateral to a secured creditor which was not
subject to the trustee's fee. In re Schneekloth, 186 B.R. 713
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ABATEMENT OF TAXES. The debtor sought
abatement of penalties assessed on unpaid FICA and FUTA
which was part of a claim filed by the IRS in the bankruptcy
case. The debtor claimed that the unpaid taxes arose when
the debtor was suffering lower sales and the debtor decided
to pay the employees' wages and suppliers instead of the
IRS in order to keep the business in operation. Although the
court acknowledged that precedent existed for abatement of
the penalties, the court held that mere financial difficulty
was an insufficient basis for the abatement of the penalties.
The court left open the possibility that abatement would be
allowed where the taxpayer's failure to pay taxes was caused
by an unforeseeable action by a third party, such as a bank
failure. Matter of Upton Printing Co., 186 B.R. 904
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1995).
AUTOMATIC STAY. During the debtor's first
bankruptcy case, the IRS filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
(NFTL) in violation of the automatic stay. The IRS did not
seek retroactive relief from the automatic stay in that case.
The bankruptcy case was dismissed and a second case filed
shortly thereafter. The IRS filed a claim in the second case
and argued that the tax lien filing was not voided by the
improper filing in the first case; therefore, the IRS claim in
the second case was a secured claim. The debtor argued that
the tax lien was void because it was filed in violation of the
automatic stay. The court held that the NFTL was void
because it was filed in violation of the automatic stay and
the IRS did not obtain relief from the automatic stay. In re
Ullrich, 186 B.R. 747 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
CLAIMS. The debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition in
August 1991 and the IRS filed a claim for 1990 taxes. The
IRS filed a second claim for 1982 through 1986 and 1990
taxes after the bar date for claims. The Bankruptcy Court
held that the untimely filed claims were not allowed because
the claims were not related to the timely filed claim. The
appellate court reversed to the extent that the untimely filed
claim was allowed but was restricted to third tier status,
under Section 726(a)(3), for distribution of estate property.
In re Waindel, 65 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'g in part,
166 B.R 87 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor claimed to have filed the tax
returns for 1981, 1982, 1984 and 1985 in 1988, more than
three years before the bankruptcy filing. The debtor
provided evidence that the returns were professionally
prepared and then sent by the debtor's counsel. The IRS
records showed filing of a substitute return filed for 1982
and a filing of the other three returns at different times in
1988. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor had
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requested an Individual Master File (IMF) which showed
that all the returns were filed, including a filing of the 1982
return in 1984. The debtor claimed that in reliance on this
record, the debtor filed for bankruptcy in order to discharge
the taxes for these years. The court held that the debtor
could not assert equitable estoppel against the IRS based on
the IMF because the debtor alleged that the 1982 return was
filed in 1988 and the IMF showed a filing in 1984, giving
notice to the debtor that the record was not reliable. The
court also held that the evidence of the filing of the other
three years was insufficient proof of the filing of the 1982
return because the debtor did not prove receipt by the IRS of
the 1982 return. In re Campbell, 186 B.R. 731 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 in 1995. The
debtors claimed a refund on their 1994 taxes and the IRS
sought to offset the refund against the debtors' pre-petition
tax liabilities, first to the unsecured portion of the taxes
owed. The trustee objected, arguing that the setoff refund
should be applied first to the secured portion of the IRS tax
claim. The court held that the setoff would be allowed and
that the IRS would be allowed to allocate the refund to the
unsecured portion of its claim. In re Lawson, 187 B.R. 6
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1995).
CONTRACTS
ADDITIONAL TERMS. The plaintiff had contracted
with the defendant for the sale of grain to the defendant. The
sale was handled through a broker but the defendant sent to
the plaintiff an acceptance memorandum which contained a
provision for inclusion of the Trade Rules of the National
Grain and Feed Association, which included a mandatory
arbitration provision. When a dispute over the contract
arose, the plaintiff brought an action in contract against the
defendant and the defendant argued that the arbitration
provision required the plaintiff to first seek arbitration of the
dispute. During the court proceedings, the one year
limitation period under the trade rules for bringing an
arbitration proceeding had passed. The court characterized
the trade rules provision as additional provisions to the
contract which were enforceable unless the provisions
resulted in surprise or hardship for the plaintiff. The court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that additional arbitration
provisions materially altered the contract as a matter of law;
instead, the court held that this determination depended on
the facts and circumstances of each case. The plaintiff
argued that the arbitration provision was a hardship on the
plaintiff because the one year limitation on bringing an
arbitration claim had passed and no remedy was available if
the provision was enforced. The court held that reduction of
a time limit for bringing an action was not a hardship
because such provisions were common in contracts and the
plaintiff had sufficient time to bring the arbitration
proceeding before the court case was brought. The plaintiff
also argued that it was surprised by the provision in that it
was not familiar with the trade rules and did not have the
time to look up the rules during the busy grain sales season.
The court held that the plaintiff was an experienced grain
seller and could have easily objected to the trade rules
provision if it did not have sufficient time or resources to
investigate them before shipping the grain. Wilson
Fertilizer & Grain v. ADM Milling, 654 N.E.2d 848 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995).
FRAUD. The plaintiffs contracted to care for the cattle
owned by the defendant corporation with the purchase price
of the cattle and the costs of feeding to be paid upon
delivery of the cattle back to the defendant. The defendants
included the officers and shareholders of the corporation
because the corporation charter had terminated two years
before the contract was entered into and the plaintiff alleged
liability by the defendants based on their status as trustees
for the defunct corporation. The plaintiffs delivered the
cattle to the defendants but were not paid. The defendants
had told the plaintiffs that no money was available but that
the plaintiffs would be paid. One of the officers then died
and the plaintiffs did not file a claim in the probate case
because of the representations of the defendants. The
plaintiffs brought an action for fraud. The court held that the
plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to prevent a summary
judgment for the individual defendants but no action could
be brought against the corporation. Ellison v. Valley View
Dairy, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The respondent managed a cattle
ranch in California owned by another person. The owner
also owned two other ranches, one of which was located on
the California-Nevada state line. The owner managed one
ranch and the border ranch was managed by another person.
Two steers on the owner's ranch tested positive for
brucellosis and a hold was placed on movement of the cattle
on that ranch. The state and federal authorities did not
immediately know about the other two ranches but when the
connection became known the APHIS informed the
respondent that the cattle on that ranch would also need to
be tested and that other cattle owned by the owner had
tested positive. The respondent sent some of the cattle to an
instate auction where two steers were sold to a slaughter
house in Oregon. The respondent was charged with
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 122 for interstate movement of
brucellosis exposed cattle. The Administrative Law Judge
held that transportation of the cattle to an instate auction did
not violate the statute. The Judicial Officer reversed,
holding that the term "movement" included transporting
cattle to a place where further interstate shipment occurred.
APHIS also alleged that the quarantined cattle were moved
interstate when some were transported to the border ranch
and the cattle crossed over into Nevada while on the ranch.
The ALJ and JO held that the evidence was insufficient to
show that the cattle actually passed over the state line where
the manager of the border ranch testified that the cattle were
prevented by fences from entering Nevada. In re John
Casey, Monty Milhouse and Timothy Puckett, 54 Agric.
Dec. 91 (1995).
DISASTER PAYMENTS. The CCC has adopted as
final regulations implementing the 1994 Disaster Payment
Program and 1994 Tree Assistance Program. 60 Fed. Reg.
52609 (Oct. 10, 1995).
MARKETING ORDERS. The respondent was a
family- owned dairy farm and processor corporation which
processed and sold milk produced only on the family farm.
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One of the shareholders of the respondent formed another
corporation with the spouse of one of the respondent's other
shareholders. The second corporation took over the milk
distribution business from the original corporation.
However, in addition to milk purchased from the
respondent, the second corporation also purchased milk
from other producers and handlers. The two corporations
were not financially linked, although the second corporation
leased cold room space at the facility owned by the
respondent. The respondent argued that it was a producer-
handler and as such was exempt from contributing to the
producer settlement fund of the area marketing order. The
Judicial Officer ruled that the purchases of the second
corporation were attributable to the respondent under three
theories: (1) the corporations were not separate because of
the interfamily relationship of the owners, (2) the second
corporation was at least indirectly controlled by the
respondent, and (3) the second corporation's use of the
respondent's cold room facility caused the milk purchased
by the second corporation to be deemed as received by the
respondent. On the basis of any of these alternative theories,
the respondent was ruled to not be a producer-handler
exempt from the producer settlement fund because the
respondent was deemed to have received more than 100
gallons of milk from outside sources on a daily basis.
Finally, the JO found that the respondent had failed to
obtain a designation from the Market Order Administrator
of producer-handler status as required by the marketing
order. Mil-Key Farm, Inc. 54 Agric. Dec. 26 (1995).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT-ALM § 9.05.*
The respondents were members of a partnership which was
a registered livestock dealer. The PSA brought a
disciplinary action against the respondents for issuing
misleading or false invoices, failing to promptly pay for
purchased livestock, and "floating" checks to create false
balances in the business bank account. The respondents
argued that the violations were caused by the independent
actions of an employee which were beyond the employee's
authority. The Administrative Law Judge found that the
employee was authorized to make the livestock purchases
and that the respondents were responsible for making the
payments for the purchases made by the employee.  The
ALJ held that, under 7 U.S.C. § 223, the actions of the
employee were deemed to be the actions of the respondents
and the respondents were held to have willfully and
repeatedly violated the act. Samuel J. Dalessio, Jr., 54
Agric. Dec. 590 (1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* In a reparations case under PACA,
the complainant sought payment for two shipments of
onions to the respondent. The respondent claimed that the
onions to be shipped were supposed to be U.S. No. 1 onions
and that inspections after delivery showed that the onions
did not comply with the grade standards. The respondent
showed that the parties had agreed to shipment of "No. 1"
onions and the Judicial Officer ruled that the term "No. 1" is
equivalent to "U.S. No. 1" as common usage in the trade.
The respondent failed to show the market value of the
onions as delivered; therefore, the Judicial Officer
discounted the value of the onions based on the percentage
of defects in each load. Rancho Dos Palmas, Inc. v. Desert
Melon Distributors, Inc., 54 Agric. Dec. 727 (1995).
The complainant, acting as an invoice, collect and remit
broker, brought a reparations action for payment for a
shipment of sweet corn shipped by the complainant's
principal to the respondent. The respondent objected to the
action, arguing that the complainant was not the real party in
interest. Under the PACA regulations, a broker is not
responsible for payment to the seller by the buyer unless
there is a specific agreement that the broker will pay if the
buyer does not pay for the commodity shipped. The Judicial
Officer found that the complainant had not agreed to pay the
principal if the respondent did not pay for the sweet corn;
therefore, the JO held that the complainant was not the real
party in interest and dismissed the case. Purepac Brokers,
Inc. v. Procacci Bros., 54 Agric. Dec. 735 (1995).
The complainant sold two shipments of onions to the
respondent. On arrival, the respondent timely informed the
complainant that the shipments were rejected because of
translucent scales. The complainant had the onions shipped
to other distributors for sale and had one shipment federally
inspected. The inspection showed no defects. The
complainant brought a PACA reparations action against the
respondent for payment for the onions at the contract price,
less the amounts received in the later sales. The Judicial
Officer held that the rejection of both shipments was
precedurally effective but the complainant had shown that
the rejection of the inspected shipment was wrongful. The
uninspected shipment; however, was not shown to have
been wrongfully rejected, and the JO awarded the
complainant damages only for the inspected shipment, equal
to the difference in the fair market price of the onions and
the price received less the additional costs of sale. McKay
v. Lusk Onion, Inc., 54 Agric. Dec. 721 (1995).
POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has adopted as
final regulations providing a definition and standard of
identity and composition for poultry products resulting from
mechanical separation and removal of bones from poultry
carcasses. The regulations also require poultry and other
meat products' labels to identify all mechanically separated
poultry products as ingredients. 60 Fed. Reg. 55962 (Nov.
3, 1995).
PRICE SUPPORT LOAN PROGRAM. The CCC has
issued regulations providing CCC with the authority to
extend loan periods during abnormal marketing conditions
for producers of wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats
and rye. 60 Fed. Reg. 55804 (Nov. 3, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GIFT. While the taxpayer was under audit by the IRS,
the taxpayer created two stock brokerage accounts for the
taxpayer's children and transferred assets to those accounts.
The taxpayer was named as custodian of the accounts but
failed to keep records of the assets as required by the Illinois
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. The taxpayer made several
withdrawals from the accounts but did not keep any record
of the withdrawals or any reimbursements. The court held
that an IRS levy against the accounts to satisfy taxes owed
by the taxpayer was proper because the transfer of assets to
the accounts was an incomplete gift. Dubisky v. United
States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,580 (7th Cir.
1995).
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GROSS ESTATE. The taxpayers were husband and
wife. The husband established a trust for one of the couple's
granddaughters and the wife established an identical trust
for the other granddaughter. Each trust named the other
taxpayer as trustee and granted the trustee the discretion to
make distributions until the beneficiary reached age 21 and
also granted the trustee the authority to reinvest trust
proceeds. The husband died and the estate challenged an
IRS ruling including the trust in the decedent's estate based
on a finding that the trusts were reciprocal. The court held
that the trusts were not reciprocal because the decedent's
powers as trustee were not a retained economic interest in
the trust. Estate of Green v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,216 (6th Cir. 1995).
LIFE INSURANCE. The taxpayer was a beneficiary of
a trust established for the beneficiary and lineal descendants
by the beneficiary's grandparents. The trust provided that a
beneficiary could serve as co-trustee but could not
participate in any decisions for discretionary distributions of
trust property.  The trust provided for the purchase of a life
insurance policy by the trust on any beneficiary's life. The
trustees amended the trust to provide that the life insurance
policy was to be held by a special trustee who acted
independently of the other trustees. The trust was required
to pay all expenses associated with the life insurance policy
upon request of the special trustee. The IRS ruled that the
proceeds of the life insurance policy upon the death of a
beneficiary were not included in the beneficiary's gross
estate and that the amendment to the trust did not cause the
trust to be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9542007, July 12,
1995.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. At the decedent’s
death, the decedent was the beneficiary of two trusts, a
marital trust and a family trust. The decedent had an
unlimited right to receive the corpus of the marital trust and
the right to receive up to 5 percent of the corpus of the
family trust if the marital trust was exhausted. At the
decedent’s death, the marital trust was not exhausted. The
IRS argued that 5 percent of the family trust corpus was
includible in the decedent’s gross estate because, at the
decedent’s death, the decedent held the power to exhaust the
marital trust and to receive the 5 percent interest. The IRS
further argued that Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) required that
any contingency relating to a decedent’s power to receive
property be out of the decedent’s control in order for the
property to be excluded from the gross estate. The court
refused to accept the IRS arguments but held that the
contingency must not be illusory and have some significant
nontax consequence. In this case, the estate failed  to
demonstrate any significant nontax consequence for the
contingency, exhaustion of the marital trust, which would
entitle the decedent to the 5 percent interest. Est. of Kurz v.
Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,215 (7th Cir.
1995), aff'g, 101 T.C. 44 (1993).
VALUATION. The taxpayers established two seven-
year irrevocable trusts funded with S corporation stock. The
taxpayers were each the beneficiary of one trust, with one
trust distributing annually 20.001 percent of the fair market
value of the trust corpus upon creation and the other trust
distributing 19.293 percent of the initial fair market value of
the trust corpus. The trusts provided that if the fair market
value of the trusts has been incorrectly determined, the
annuity amounts were to be adjusted accordingly. If the
beneficiary died before the termination of the trust, a
fraction of the trust corpus passed to the beneficiary’s estate
equal to the fractional amount included in the beneficiary’s
estate under federal estate tax law. If the beneficiary
survived the termination of the trust, the trust corpus passed
to the beneficiary’s children. The IRS ruled that the trust
interests were qualified annuity interests for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2702.  The IRS also ruled that because the trusts
had a high probability of being exhausted prior to
termination, the value of the retained annuity interest could
be no greater than the present value of the payments
receivable until the exhaustion of the trust. Ltr. Rul.
9543049, Aug. 3, 1995., modifying text but not result of,
Ltr. Rul. 9444033, Aug. 5, 1994.
The taxpayer leased a summer residence from a family
corporation in which the taxpayer's stock interest equaled
the value of the property leased from the corporation. The
taxpayer transferred the stock and the rights under the lease
to a trust for the benefit of the taxpayer with a remainder to
pass as appointed by the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the
trust was a qualified personal residence trust not subject to




COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer received a jury award of
compensatory and punitive damages in a personal injury
action and sought to excluded the punitive damages from
taxable income. The court reviewed the case law and
acknowledged a split of authority and an inconclusive
legislative history of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), but held that, based
on the doctrine of narrowly construing exclusions, the
punitive damages were not excludible from income.
O'Gilvie v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,508 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,567 (D. Kan. 1992).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was a
veterinarian who operated a cattle breeding activity and
goat-raising activity. The taxpayer was not allowed losses
associated with the cattle breeding business because no
animals were kept at the farm nor were other farming
activities carried on at the farm. The losses from the goat-
raising activity were also denied because the activity was
not engaged in for profit. Westbrook v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,587 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C.
Memo. 1993-634.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. A decedent's estate, a
marital trust, a private foundation, two corporations and two
individuals owned undivided interests in several pieces of
real property. As part of litigation challenging the
distribution of the decedent's estate, the owners agreed to an
exchange of interests in the real properties so that each party
would own separate properties in fee. The value of the
properties was determined by independent appraisal and the
exchanges were all for equal value. The IRS ruled that the
exchanges did not cause recognition of gain or loss as to the
real property but did not rule on the tax consequences of the
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exchanges of any tangible personal property involved.  Ltr.
Rul. 9543011, July 24, 1995.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. An S corporation
merged with a new Limited Liability Company (LLC). As a
result of the merger, the S corporation was liquidated with
the sole shareholder receiving an interest in the LLC. The
IRS ruled that the LLC was taxable as a partnership because
(1) the LLC lacked free transferability of interests since,
under the LLC agreement, interests in the LLC could not be
assigned without consent of a majority of the other
members, and (2) the LLC lacked continuity of life since the
LLC agreement required the dissolution of the LLC by the
death, bankruptcy, incompetency or withdrawal of a
member unless a majority of the remaining members agreed
to continue the LLC. The IRS also ruled that no gain or loss
was recognized to the corporation upon transfer of its assets
to the LLC unless the corporation realized a net decrease in
liabilities in excess of the corporation's basis in the
transferred assets. The IRS also ruled that the corporation
recognized capital gain or loss on the distribution of
property to the sole shareholder in its liquidation of the
stock. The gain or loss passed through to the shareholder
causing an adjustment to basis in the stock. The shareholder
would also recognize gain or loss on the difference between
the value of the share of the LLC received and the basis of
the merged corporation's stock. Ltr. Rul. 9543017, July 26,
1995.
TAX MATTERS PARTNER. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations for determining the tax matters partner
of LLCs which are taxed as partnerships. The proposed
regulations provide that LLC members with the exclusive
authority, alone or with other members, to make
management decisions necessary for the conduct of LLC
business are to be treated as general partners for purposes of
the tax matters partner regulations. If no member has the
exclusive authority to manage the LLC business, then all
members will be treated as general partners for purposes of
the tax matters partner regulations. The proposed
regulations also incorporate Rev. Proc. 88-16, 1988-1 C.B.
691 which provides the rules for determining when it is
impracticable for the IRS to choose a tax matters partner on
the basis of the holder of the largest profits interest and what
rules will be applied for choosing the tax matters partner in
that case.  60 Fed. Reg. 55228 (Oct. 30, 1995), adding
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(7)-2.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayers owned
some units in a 53 unit condominium complex. The units
were rented for less than seven day periods to third parties
when the taxpayers did not use the units. The taxpayers and
the other owners contracted with a management company to
manage the rental of the units, including maintenance,
staffing of offices and bookkeeping. The owners contributed
more than 100 hours per year to the rental of their units but
fewer hours than the management company. The IRS ruled
that the rental of the units was a trade or business; however,
because the taxpayer contributed fewer hours to the business
than the management company, the taxpayer did not
materially participate in the business and any income or loss
was from a passive activity. The IRS noted that if the
taxpayers could be considered to have formed a partnership
with the other owners, the participation of the management
company could be considered as participation by the
partnership and the partnership would be considered to
actively participate in the business. Ltr. Rul. 9543003, July
10, 1995.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a reminder that parents
of children born in 1995 and who claim the children as
dependants on their 1995 tax returns, must include a social
security number (SSN) for the children or write in 11/95
(for children born in November 1995) or 12/95 (for children
born in December 1995). SSNs may be obtained by filing
Form SS-5 and presenting a birth certificate and one other
piece of identification to the Social Security Administration.
IR 95-62, Nov. 1, 1995.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ORGANIZATION EXPENSES. The taxpayers operated
a business of showing exotic automobiles at shows. The
taxpayers established an S corporation for the purpose of
building and operating a permanent display room for the
automobiles. The court held that the taxpayers were not
entitled to deduct currently the costs of the display room
because the expenses were incurred prior to the operation of
the business by the corporation. The expenses were capital
pre-opening expenses. Selig v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
519.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. An S corporation
leased commercial and residential properties. The
corporation provided maintenance and utility services for
the tenants. The IRS ruled that the corporation provided
sufficient services to the tenants such that the rental income
was not passive investment income. Ltr. Rul. 9543028,
July 27, 1995.
TERMINATION. The debtors were S corporations
wholly-owned by one shareholder. The debtors filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the trustee filed income tax
returns for the corporations for three years during the case.
The shareholder did not object to the returns or file Form
8082 "Notice of Inconsistent Treatment" with the IRS.
Instead, the shareholder filed a motion for determination of
tax liability and argued that the filing of the bankruptcy case
terminated the S corporation elections of the debtors. The
court held that I.R.C. § 1362(d) provided only three ways
for an S corporation election to terminate and filing for
bankruptcy was not one of them. In addition, the court noted
that the shareholder could have terminated the election and
could have objected to the trustee's returns by filing Form
8082. In re Stadler Associates, Inc., 186 B.R. 762 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1995).
TRUSTS. The decedent, spouse and child were the only
shareholders of an S corporation. At the death of the
decedent, the decedent's shares passed to a trust for the
spouse with a remainder to the child. The trust provided for
annual distribution of all trust income and allowed
distribution of trust principal only to the current beneficiary.
The IRS ruled that the trust was a QSST. Ltr. Rul.
9543028, July 27, 1995.
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Musgrove v. U.S., 33 Fed. Cls. 657 (1995)
(transfers with retained interests) see p. 125 supra.
Liddle v. Comm’r, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995), aff’g,






INTENTIONAL TORT. The plaintiff was an
employee of an egg farm. The farm contracted with another
defendant to produce eggs from chickens supplied by the
defendant. The defendant was responsible for providing
insecticides for control of flies in the chicken houses. The
plaintiff was injured after applying an insecticide supplied
by the defendant and sued the chicken farm for intentional
tort and the defendant for negligence. The plaintiff alleged
that the insecticide was used by three other employees
before the plaintiff's injury and all three employees became
ill. The court discussed the level of negligence required to
prove an intentional tort and noted that the standards set by
prior Ohio cases were not clear but held that the plaintiff
had alleged sufficient facts that a jury could find that the
egg farm had knowledge that the plaintiff's injury was
substantially certain to occur. The court also held that the
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show that the
defendant was negligent in supplying the insecticide
because the plaintiff did not allege any foreknowledge by
the defendant that the egg farm employees would
mishandle the insecticide. Blanton v. Pine Creek Farms,
654 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
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